The Black Spider Letters – Part II

This is the second in a series of four blog posts looking at the Supreme Court’s decision in R (Evans) v HM Attorney General.  The first post went through the background to the case and this post will focus on the Court’s decision in respect of section 53 of the FOIA.

By a majority of 5:2 the Supreme Court held that the certificate issued by the Attorney General was invalid.  However, there was a split among the 5 as to the reasons for the certificate being invalid.  Lords Neuberger, Kerr and Reed were in agreement with one another, while  Lord Mance and Lady Hail found that the Certificate was invalid for different reasons.  Lords Wilson and Hughes disagreed entirely and would have allowed the Attorney General’s appeal.

The reasoning of Lord Neuberger (with home Lords Kerr and Reed agreed)

The Justices here looked at two constitutional principals which are at the cornerstone of our democracy and are at the very centre of the Rule of Law.  The first of those principals is that decisions of a Court are binding upon the parties involved, subject to rights of appeal (and as Lord Neuberger pointed out, a Statute passed by Parliament given the supremacy of Parliament in our democracy).  The second of those principals is that the decisions of the Executive are reviewable by the Judiciary, not the reverse.

Lord Neuberger said, at paragraph [52], that the way in which the Attorney General interpreted section 53 of the FOIA

 “flouts the first principle and stands the second principle on its head. It involves saying that a final decision of a court can be set aside by a member of the executive (normally the minister in charge of the very department against whom the decision has been given) because he does not agree with it. And the fact that the member of the executive can put forward cogent and/or strongly held reasons for disagreeing with the court is, in this context, nothing to the point: many court decisions are on points of controversy where opinions (even individual judicial opinions) may reasonably differ, but that does not affect the applicability of these principles.”

He went on to state at paragraph [58] that “section 53 falls far short of being “crystal clear” in saying that a member of the executive can override the decision of a court because he disagrees with it.”  This drew on a line of authority, fully set out in paragraphs [53] – [57], that concludes unless Parliament has made it crystal clear that it is legislating contrary to the rule of law it is to be presumed that it is not doing so.

Lord Neuberger went on to consider previous authorities where the Court of Appeal had considered the question of whether Parliament had “intended [that] a member of the executive to be able freely to consider, or reconsider, for himself the very issues, on the same facts, which had been determined by another person or a tribunal.” [60]

Lord Neuberger concluded that section 53 of the FOIA  does not permit the accountable person mentioned therein to issue a certificate “simply because, on the same facts and admittedly reasonably, he takes a different view from that adopted by a court of record after a full public oral hearing.”  He also noted that the basis for this conclusion could not have bene unknown to Parliament at the time the FOIA was passed.

Lord Mance (with whom Lady Hale agreed)

The conclusion reached by Lord Neuberger was different to that which was reached by Lord Mance (who Lady Hale agreed with).  They found that the accountable person was able to issue a certificate under section 53 of the FOIA simply because they disagreed with the Tribunal’s decision; however, that where the certificate was issued in respect of findings of fact or rulings of law which were fully explained would require an extremely clear justification.  Lord Mance found that the Certificate issued by the Attorney General under section 53 of the FOIA did “not engage with or give any real answer to [the Upper Tribunal’s] closely reasoned analysis and its clear rebuttal of any suggestion that a risk of misperception could justify withholding of disclosure.”

While the Attorney General, or indeed any other accountable person as defined by section 53, could issue a certificate under section 53 because he disagreed with the findings of the Tribunal, on the same facts and arguments as were before the Tribunal, he did not justify his decision enough to enable the certificate to stand and so the certificate was invalid.

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2 thoughts on “The Black Spider Letters – Part II

  1. Pingback: prout de jure | The Black Spider Letters – Part III

  2. Pingback: prout de jure | The Black Spire Letters – Part IV

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